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Background: Is There a Problem? 
 The International Trade Commission (ITC) is an integral part of the American patent 
system. Although it can only block imports on behalf of domestic industries, now that most 
technology products are manufactured abroad and Congress has relaxed the domestic industry 
requirement,2 nearly every patentee is a potential ITC complainant and nearly every patent 
defendant is a potential ITC respondent. The ITC decides patent cases in less than half the time 
district courts do, on average,3 and hears a significant share of the nation’s patent trials.4 
But the ITC is also an outlier in the American patent system. The ITC can’t award 
damages or hear counterclaims. It’s easier to get an injunction from the ITC than from a district 
court, particularly if you are a patent assertion entity (“PAE” or patent “troll”) that uses primarily 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor © 2012.  My testimony draws upon the scholarly literature about the International Trade 
Commission, including three law review articles, an amicus brief, and an ITC treatise that I have authored or co-
authored: Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 
WM. & Mary L. Rev. 63 (2008), Protecting Domestic Industries, 28 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 169, 
171 (2011), Patents, Holdup, and the ITC (with Mark Lemley)__Cornell Law. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856608, RAND Patents and Exclusion Orders: Brief of 19 
Economics and Law Professors, submitted in ITC Case 337-TA-745 (July 2012) (with Carl Shapiro, Richard 
Gilbert, Arti Rai and 14 others), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2102865, and 
Section 337 Patent Investigation Management Guide 11-20 (with Peter Menell and others) Lexis Nexis 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603330. Able empirical research assistance was provided 
by Nicole Shanahan, Wesley Helmholz, Peluchette, and Danielle Debroeck, and data was generously supplied by 
RPX Corp., the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Litigation Study, Lex Machina, Gazelle Technologies, Robert Fram and 
Ashley Miller. Support was provided by Dirk Calcoen. 
2 See John Mezzalingua Assocs. v. International Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
statutory change that permitted PAEs to claim “domestic industry” status at the ITC). 
3 Comments of Deanna Okun, ITC Chairwoman as reported in May 4, 2012 Daily Update -- BNA's Patent, 
Trademark & Copyright Journal (reporting that ITC actions took, on average 13.7 months, versus an average district 
court pendency in 35.3 months), Accord, Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra, at Abstract. 
4 Approximately 15% in 2010, Protecting Domestic Industries, supra, at n6. 
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patents for licensing, rather than to support the commercialization or transfer of technology.5 In 
the 6 years since the Supreme Court decided eBay,6 district courts have given contested 
injunctions to PAEs exactly once by our count, and three-quarters of the time to practicing 
companies;7 in contrast, the ITC still routinely awards injunctions to all comers. The impact of 
an ITC “exclusion order” preventing importation of a product can be dramatic. To comply with 
such an order, a company must pull its products from the market or redesign them. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly said that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy,8 but the ITC is not 
bound by the Court’s jurisprudence on patent injunctions.9  
Patent litigants know this. As a practitioner said recently, “[when] you are asking people 
to write [checks that] are sufficiently large [] they can’t write them without the Sword of 
Damocles of a jury verdict or [an] ITC injunction hanging over their heads.”10 Because 
injunctions remain readily available at the ITC, PAEs and product-producing companies alike 
have flocked to this once-obscure trade agency, generally in search of an injunction or the 
credible threat of one. 
In the last 18 months (Jan. 2011-Jun 2012), for example, PAEs brought more than a 
quarter of Section 337 patent cases, and nearly half of the total respondents appearing before the 
ITC were there because of a PAE-initiated case.11 Usually, the patent was purchased by the 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay, 547 U.S. 396 (2006) (describing “firms [that] use patents not as a 
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”). 
6 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388  (2006). 
7 Patent Holdup supra, at Figure 1. 
8 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982), citing Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496, 500 (1941); see also, Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (“the principles of equity [] militate heavily 
against the grant of an injunction except in the most extraordinary circumstances.”). 
9   Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
10 Interview with contingent fee patent lawyer as reported in David Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Lawyer 
Representation in Patent Law, __ Ala. Law Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2012), at 32, May 30 2012 draft. file with the 
author, a version of the paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990651. 
11 23 out of 81 patent investigations and 332 out of 701 non-unique patent respondents, using data provided by RPX 
Corp., and further coded and analyzed. See also Robert D. Fram & Ashley Miller, The Rise of Non-Practicing Entity 
Litigation at the ITC: The State of the Law and Litigation Strategy (Jan. 5, 2011), at 7 (unpublished manuscript on 
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PAE.12  
Though Section 337 was created to keep foreign pirates out of American markets, recent 
PAE cases have targeted domestic companies almost twice as often as foreign respondents (209 
times vs. 123 times).13 (Appendix A). Companies in California (92), New Jersey (25), New York 
(14), and Texas (14) have together been named more times than companies in the rest of the 
world. In addition to Cisco and Ford, who are also testifying today, American companies--like 
Apple, Walmart, and Schering Plough14--have been sued by foreign and domestic complainants. 
 In my opinion, that some litigants are taking advantage of the ITC’s injunction record to 
hold up respondents is a significant problem, though not the only problem, In today’s patent 
system. It undoes the progress that eBay represents, and it contributes to the favorable climate for 
patent trolling and holdup present in today’s patent system. This climate is driving investment 
towards patent speculation, and away from productive enterprises. Although the focus of today’s 
hearing is on the law, what really matters is what happens outside the courtroom, particularly 
among companies making investment decisions. Consider the following: 
 Earlier this year, Google spent $12.5B to buy Motorola Mobility and its patents.15 It spent 
less than half of that, $5.2B on R&D in 2011.16  In 2011, Apple spent $2.4B on R&D17 
                                                                                                                                                             
file with the author (reporting an increase in the percentage of companies relying on their licensing activities to 
show a domestic industry from 13% in 2000-2006 to 35% in the first 8 months of 2010). Based on an extension of 
their database provided for purposes of this testimony, the rate in 2011 (through Oct. 1) was 41%. Okun, supra, 
reported that 8-10% investigations from 2006 to 2011 were brought by PAEs/NPEs, our analysis found the number 
to be 12%. 
12 Available assignment records at the USPTO indicate that at least 15 of the 23 investigations were based on patents 
reassigned from their original owner, in some cases many times (see, e.g. patent 5,862,511, reassigned 7 times 
before being asserted by Beacon GmBH of Switzerland in investigation 337-TA-814).  
13 Based on an analysis of 332 unique respondents named in PAE suits from January 2011-June 2012, 123 were 
from foreign jurisdictions and 209 were from domestic jurisdictions. See Appendix A 
14 See, e.g., TA-337-710 and TA-337-768. 
15 Google Official Blog, We’ve acquired Motorola Mobility, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/weve-
acquired-motorola-mobility.html (last visited May 24, 2012); Jenna Wortham, Google Closes $12.5 Billion Deal to 
Buy Motorola Mobility, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/google-closes-12-5-billion-deal-to-buy-motorola-
mobility/ (last visited May 24, 2012). 
16 Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Jan 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312512025336/d260164d10k.htm (reporting an R&D 
expenditure of $5.2B in 2011).  
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but contributed more, approximately $2.6B, to a single transaction to buy patents from 
Nortel.18 Though these patent investments will obviously last more than the single year in 
which they were bought, the same can also be said of the R&D investments.  
 Acacia, a very well-managed company that asserts patents as a business model, has a 
market capitalization of close to $2B and 55 employees, which puts it into the bottom 
½% of public companies in the service sector in terms of employees.19 Other companies 
in their sector with comparable market cap have an average of 11,500 employees, based 
on our analysis.20 Although they create revenue for the patentholders that they partner 
with, this is not unique among service sector companies, many of which generate revenue 
for their customers. 
 
 As one investor put it on a blog board recently:  
 
“In the past six months I have been approached by two investors with interests in large 
patent portfolio investment. They used to invest in start-ups. Why the change? Less risk 
[and?] bigger potential gains. It’s a no brainer. Investing in invention is for schmucks. 
They are wrong but accurate.”21  
 
When I asked renowned venture capitalist Brad Feld if this was really happening, he 
replied “of course it's happening...   It's the classically grotesque side of it all - money always 
goes to where there's a perceived opportunity, regardless of the dynamics around it. And in this 
case it has nothing to do with creating jobs or innovation or anything productive for society.”22 
 
If There’s a Problem, How Can It be Fixed? 
If it’s true that there’s a problem, how can the problem be remedied? Could the ITC fix 
it? Will private litigants work it out for themselves? Or does Congress need to step in? The 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Oct. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312511282113/d220209d10k.htm (reporting an R&D 
expenditure of $2.4B in fiscal year 2011 (ending September 30, 2011)). 
18 Apple, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), (July 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312511192493/d10q.htm (“On June 27, 2011, the 
Company, as part of a consortium, participated in the acquisition of Nortel’s patent portfolio for an overall purchase 
price of $4.5 billion, of which the Company’s contribution will be approximately $2.6 billion.”).  
19 Microaxis investing report, http://www.macroaxis.com/invest/ratio/ACTG--Number_of_Employees 
20 Based on an analysis of 32 companies in the service sector in	the	$1.9‐$2.0B	market	capitalization	range. 
21 Comments of Nicolas White, Tangible IP, in response to Joff Wild, Intellectual Asset Management blog post Now 
that IP is Mainstream, Let’s Not Mess This Once in a Lifetime Opportunity Up, July 6, 2012, both available at 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=b0610bab-d371-4401-bd6f-6b12368b8eb0 
22 Personal email exchange on file with the author. 
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remainder of this submission addresses these questions, keeping in mind that even if 27% of ITC 
patent cases are brought by patent trolls, the vast majority of patent cases are not; that the ITC 
has a proven record of efficiently resolving patent disputes; and that in some cases, due to a lack 
of jurisdiction over the defendant, the ITC represents the only form of relief available to a 
complainant.23 My answer in short is that the current statute gives the ITC many options for 
reducing rent-seeking behavior among litigants. It should use these options. If the ITC proves 
unwilling or unable to do so, Congress should act. 
 
What the ITC Could Do 
To the question of what the ITC could do, I say: a lot.  
 
Tailor Exclusion Orders through Grandfathering, Delay, and in some cases Denial 
First, the ITC could reduce holdup by changing the way it issues exclusion orders. The 
statute does not compel the ITC to grant exclusion orders in all cases, but only when consistent 
with the public interest.24 The ITC has rarely tailored or denied relief based on the statutory 
public interest factors, but today’s cases present new challenges, including whether a patent over 
a small invention by a patent troll should be used to exclude a big product,25 or whether a 
standards-essential patent subject to a promise to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms (RAND) should be the basis for the exclusion order.26 Exclusion orders in these cases can 
                                                 
23 Based on my research, two-thirds of ITC cases have a district court counterpart, suggesting that is not often the 
case. Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra, at Abstract. However, it is possible that the counterpart district court case 
named fewer defendants, due to a lack of jurisdiction.   
24 19 USC 1337(d)(1). 
25 See, e.g. in Chien & Lemley supra, see also Colleen Chien & Mark Lemley, Patents and the Public Interest, NEW 
YORK TIMES.COM, Dec. 13, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/opinion/patents-smartphones-
and-the-public-interest.html 
26 18 professors and I argue that it generally should not, unless district court jurisdiction is lacking. See Chien et. al., 
RAND Patents and Exclusion Orders, supra. 
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harm competitive conditions and consumers when many productive, non-infringing components, 
third-parties relying on the enjoined product, and pro-consumer, pro-competitive benefits are 
shut down to give the patentee control over only a single small component.  
The ITC could deny exclusion orders in certain types of cases. However, this could be 
unsatisfying after an intense and expensive trial, especially in cases where the patentee has no 
other recourse. A more palatable suggestion, then, would be for the ITC to issue exclusion orders 
but structure them to ameliorate the harms to competition and consumers. Two ways to do so are 
to tailor injunction scope and stay injunctions. In a case where a design-around is possible, for 
example, awarding an injunction but delaying its start could deter infringement in a way that 
minimizes disruption to consumers and the holdup to manufacturers.27  The ITC could do so 
without interfering with patentee incentives: a prevailing patentee can seek damages in federal 
court for infringing sales in addition to bringing a case in the ITC. If the patent truly was 
essential, the patentee could obtain an injunction after the stay expired. If the ITC does make 
expanded use of stays, it should also clarify existing procedures for obtaining Commission 
approval of design-arounds,28 in order to avoid confusion and delay in introducing the new 
product. 
In some cases, more significant limits on exclusion orders may be warranted. Suppose, 
for instance, the infringing component is small but, because of the nature of the product, the 
potential impact of an exclusion order on downstream products, related products, and third 
parties is large. In such a case, the Commission could tailor the scope of the injunction to reduce 
harm to competition, for example by grandfathering in existing products.  ITC cases that don’t 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2035-40 
(2007) (showing that a stay in injunctive relief to allow design-arounds significantly reduces holdup risk). 
28 See, e.g., in Blakeslee & Christopher V. Meservy, Seeking Adjudication of a Design-Around in Section 337 Patent 
Infringement Investigations: Procedural Context and Strategic Considerations, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 385, 408-411 
(2007).  
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implicate these types of concerns, for example covering patented pharmaceuticals or piratical 
copying, shouldn’t be affected. 
 
In Accordance with the Statute, Consistently Apply the Domestic Industry Requirement  
A second way the ITC could limit the ability of PAEs to bring cases in the ITC is by 
more consistently and rigorously enforcing the statute’s domestic industry requirement to 
licensing-based complainants.29 The ITC typically requires complainants to prove that they 
practice the asserted patent on an element-by-element basis. However, it applies a relaxed 
“nexus” standard to licensing-based complainants, even when their licensees are making 
products. This practice is inconsistent with the statute and its history. 30 The ITC should require 
just as much of a connection to be proven between the asserted patent and an “article” (provided 
that the technology exists and is not in the process of being made), when licensing-based 
complainants bring their cases as when others do.31 It should apply the statutory preference it 
recognized in the Coaxial Cable case for ex ante over ex post licensing32 in order to exclude 
rent-seeking behavior. 
 
Change, Within Limits, is Underway and More Opportunities Exist for It To Continue 
There are some signs that the ITC is willing to evolve in these directions. The ITC 
recently tailored its exclusion order in the 337-TA-710 case to include delay and 
grandfathering,33 and it has evolved its domestic industry case law.34  
                                                 
29 See Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries, supra. 
30 Id. (describing same) 
31 Id. 
32 Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and Products Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 
337-TA-650, Comm'n Op. at 49-50 (Apr. 14, 2010), EDIS Doc. No. 422832. 
33 Commission Decision in Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices TA-710-337 at 83 (“HTC shall be 
permitted to import into the United States [for 19 months] . . . refurbished handsets to be provided to consumers as 
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Yet, these changes have come slowly, especially relative to developments in the industry 
of patent assertion.35 The ITC’s domestic industry and public interest caselaw has not stopped 
PAEs from flocking to the ITC as nuanced injunctive relief remains the exception at the ITC, not 
the rule. The Federal Circuit has said on several occasions that “the Commission has broad 
discretion in selecting the form, scope, and extent of the remedy.”36 Yet the ITC has been 
reluctant to embrace this discretion and role in setting patent policy. Commissioners have 
repeatedly said that, as a quasi-judicial creature of statute, the ITC is “not a policy-making 
body.”37 Yet the largely deferential standard of review that the ITC’s remedy determinations 
enjoy38 gives the ITC the ability to make policy through its adjudication.39 
Thus, it seems that for the Commission to change course, the right cases need to come up 
and the facts need to be properly developed. Progress will necessarily be slower if the ITC fails 
to exercise the discretion it has to evolve its caselaw, make forceful precedents, and set policy 
direction. The Supreme Court has not, to my knowledge, ever taken an ITC case, but perhaps it 
                                                                                                                                                             
replacements”) and 81 (“T-Mobile itself has advised the Commission that a four-month transition period would 
likely be sufficient . . . . We find T-Mobile’s suggestion to be reasonable and within our authority to implement.”).  
34 See, e.g., Coaxial Cables, supra and Certain Multimedia Display and Navigation Devices and Systems, 
Components Thereof, and Products Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-694, Comm'n Op. at 8 (Aug. 8, 
2011), EDIS Doc. No. 456236 (stressing the need for a particular nexus between the asserted patent and portfolio 
licensing expenses to be shown). 
35 Described, e.g. in Colleen Chien, Turn the Table on Patent Trolls, Forbes.com August 9, 2011 available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn-the-tables-on-patent-trolls/, and Colleen Chien 
The Economics of Patent Assertion, draft paper in progress. 
36 Hyundai Electronics Industries Co., Ltd. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990), citing 
Viscofan, S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed.Cir.1986). 
37 See, e.g., Stanford Patent Institutions Summit May 21, 2012, video available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qgo_hx1xwxw 
38 The ITC’s remedy determinations are subject to reversal only when they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Spansion, 629 F.3d 1331 at 1358; accord Epistar Corp. v. Int'l 
Trade Comm'n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 
1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355 
(Fed.Cir.2008) (applying the framework established by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984) to an ITC order, and stating that if “the statute in question is ambiguous and the agency's 
interpretation is reasonable,” “a court must defer to an agency's construction of a statute governing agency conduct.” 
(quoting Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
39 As its Commissioners have recognized, see, e.g., Stanford Patent Institutions Summit May 21, 2012, video 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qgo_hx1xwxw 
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should, at the recommendation of the Solicitor General for example. The ITC could also use 
additional input from agencies whose consultation to the ITC is required by statute.40  
 The ITC now has a number of cases before it that raise the issues contemplated by this 
hearing, in some cases for the first time. Through public interest commentary, they are 
developing a better sense of how exclusion orders impact consumers and competitive conditions. 
Unusually, the ITC has also recently received the attention of governmental agencies like the 
FTC, DOJ,41 and Director Kappos of the PTO.42 In the next six to twelve months, the ITC will 
have a chance to react and potentially change course in response to this greater input from 
outside stakeholders.  
 
The Role of Litigants  
 Will litigants be able to solve the “ITC problem” on their own through private ordering? I 
am not optimistic – they have less access to help and self-help than they do in district court. 
However, litigants can play an important role in evolving the ITC’s decision-making.  
 
Help the ITC and Document the Impact of ITC Jurisprudence 
Litigants sued in the ITC have several options. Accused parties can try to invalidate the 
patent, form joint-defense groups, or control costs.43 However, some litigant self-help measures 
don’t translate to the ITC. Many of the AIA provisions that were intended to curb litigation 
                                                 
40 19 USC 1337(b)(2), read with its statutory history, requires the ITC to consult with governmental departments and 
agencies when considering the public interest in the context of an exclusion order“ as it considers appropriate.” 
41 With respect to the issue of RAND patents and injunctions, described e.g. in Chien, et. al, RAND Patents and 
Exclusion Orders, supra and during Senate hearings on this issue on July 11,  2012 described 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/07/at-senate-hearing-ftc-and-doj-argue.html 
42 Joff Wild, Kappos Explains Concerns over FRAND-related Injunctions and Calls for Balanced Approach, 
Intellectual Asset Management Blog, http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=3a9386c9-ee12-4159-
918a-377310cec49c (June 27, 2012).  
43 A variety of self-help measures are described, e.g., in Colleen Chien, Turn the Table on Patent Trolls, Forbes.com 
August 9, 2011 available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn-the-tables-on-patent-trolls/ 
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abuses, such as the misjoinder rules and provisions relating to stays of cases pending a Section 
18 challenge to transitional covered business method patents, apply to civil cases, not to Section 
337 actions at the ITC. By statutory mandate, the ITC must resolve cases “at the earliest 
practicable time,”44 making it harder for the agency to wait for the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) or district court to determine if a patent is valid or infringed. ITC cases are extremely 
resource intensive, making attorneys less willing to share costs. As is the case with respect to 
district court cases, PAEs that bring ITC actions are invulnerable to countersuit.  
 Perhaps the greatest contribution litigants can make to reforming the ITC is to help the 
ITC help itself. In order for the ITC to make good law, parties need to, for example, avoid 
settlement before the ITC can make a decision, help develop the factual record, ask for flexible 
remedies and the desired application of domestic industry, and where appropriate, appeal 
Commission decisions to allow for appellate courts to weigh in. In short, litigants can engage in 
strategic or impact litigation, and continue to help other governmental bodies understand the 
impact of exclusion orders on consumers and competitive conditions. 
 
What Congress Could Do 
Exercise Oversight 
 Through these hearings, members of Congress are already providing welcome attention 
to the ITC. This attention should be informed by the good work of the ITC and its important role 
in today’s economy. However, the areas that this and related Committees find problematic 
should also be brought to the attention of the ITC with the policy direction that the ITC is 
reluctant to develop. As the ITC makes decisions over the next 6-12 months, on PAEs and other 
cases before it, Congress could commission a study or further hearings to look at the how the 
                                                 
44 19 USC 1337(b)(1). 
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ITC has changed its decision-making in response to the oversight and input it receives and the 
impacts of these decisions. Has the ITC done anything to discourage rent-seeking behavior 
through interpretation of its standing requirements? Have companies been able to design around 
exclusion orders or had to pull their products? Have the injunction standards diverged even 
further as district courts decide similar cases and come to different results?  Perhaps members of 
Congress could hold hearings with the Commission and/or commission a study of the evolution 
and impact of the ITC’s cases over the next 6-12 month period. If this study shows that things 
have not changed, Congress should change the law. 
 
Change the Law  
 If Congress does change the statute, it should focus on harmonizing ITC and district court 
remedies. The most effective way to prevent the ITC from becoming a way to circumvent eBay 
is to require eBay to apply to ITC proceedings as well. However, the change should not be 
limited to eBay, but be done in a way that allows the ITC to benefit from the future evolution of 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court jurisprudence on patent remedies. I take no position on 
whether or not the ITC should be authorized to decide damages, a topic which raises a host of 
issues.45 However, modifying existing bond and penalty provisions to provide more flexibility to 
the ITC to award damages would make the option of denying an exclusion order more palatable, 
and reduce the pressure on the ITC to grant injunctions.46 It may also make sense to consider 
creating a “fast track” to district court for ITC cases that have been decided in favor of the 
patentee but without an exclusion order. 
I am more cautious about attempts to redraw the domestic industry requirement. Such 
                                                 
45 Some of which are discussed in Chien, Patently Protectionist, supra. 
46 These suggestions are more fully fleshed out in Chien & Lemley, supra. 
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attempts must be evaluated with attempts to circumvent the new line in mind – determined 
investors may partner with practicing companies to bring ITC actions or invest in 
commercialization efforts just to gain standing at the ITC should the rules be changed in 
particular ways, for example. In addition, the history of accusations of violations of national 
treatment from our trading partners should also be kept in mind.47 That the ITC has remained 
relatively available to patentholders belies, in part, accusations that the venue is protectionist.48 
Finally, if Congress amends the law to reform patent litigation (for example through 
reforms like the misjoinder rules), it should also keep the ITC in mind and consider how the 
reforms should apply, perhaps in some modified form. 
 
Conclusion 
 The ITC’s unique features create opportunities as well as challenges for the patent system 
and its litigants, namely rent-seeking caused by the ITC’s more favorable injunction standard. 
The statute provides ways for the ITC to overcome some of these challenges, however the ITC 
must use them. If the ITC does not show a willingness or ability to do so within a limited period 
of time, Congress should act. I thank the Chairman and members of the Committee for the 







                                                 
47 See e.g., in Chien, Patently Protectionist supra. 
48 Id.  
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